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The Integrative Effects of Global Legal Pluralism
MONICA HAKIMI*
Legal pluralism is rooted in a set of empirical observations about the world’s diversity. Because people have vastly different interests, goals, and values, they routinely disagree about how
governance authority ought to be exercised. They disagree both about who should be entitled to
make particular governance decisions and about what the decisions should be. And though they
might at times find ways to compromise or change their positions, they often do not. The defining
feature of a pluralist legal structure is that it does not finally or authoritatively resolve these conflicts.
It allows competing claims about the exercise of governance authority to coexist and linger; such
claims are settled, if at all, with only case-specific, discretionary, or provisional accommodations.
International lawyers widely understand that legal pluralism is a fact of global life and that it
can, in certain settings, be desirable. But many still approach it with some trepidation. A prominent
skeptical claim is that pluralist structures lack the “centripetal or integrative resources” for unifying
people around a governance project1 and risk “unleash[ing] centrifugal forces that make a decently
ordered public life impossible.”2 This claim has been salient with respect to two kinds of conflicts
that are routine in international law: (1) conflicts that play out within particular legal arrangements,
and (2) conflicts that cut across legal arrangements. For each kind of conflict, the claim is directed
at the pluralist structure itself. The stated problem—the thing that is thought to disintegrate the
association—is that competing legal positions are not reconciled or resolved but allowed to coexist,
fester, and repeatedly reappear.
My goal in this chapter is to challenge that claim. Although other scholars have already argued that the claim is overdrawn, I aim to contest its central premise. I argue that ineradicable governance conflicts are not necessarily dissociative for the people who participate in them. To the
contrary, creating space for these people to have their conflicts in relatively constructive ways can be
productive for the group. It is a way for the participants to engage together on a joint enterprise,
despite their many disagreements, and thus to preserve the enterprise as a going concern that binds
them.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Part I elaborates on the skeptical claim and situates it within
the literature on international law. Part II draws on work in political theory, anthropology, and U.S.
constitutional law to establish the theoretical foundation for my retort. I explain why conflict can
help constitute and fortify, rather than disintegrate or weaken, a political community—meaning the

* James V. Campbell Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This chapter is an adapted version of my article, “Constructing an International Community,” American Journal of International Law 111, no. 2 (April 2017): 317–56.
1 Turkuler Isiksel, “Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm,” Global Constitutionalism 2, no. 2 (July 2013): 182.
2 William A. Galston, Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political Theory and Practice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
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group of people who partake in a given governance project. Part III then uses that foundation to
examine the political community that centers at the World Trade Organization (WTO). As applied
to this community, the skeptical claim is especially unconvincing. Although the WTO’s future is
uncertain, it for many years epitomized a strong and highly integrated global governance arrangement.3 It was also routinely the site of pluralist conflict. I argue that at least some of this conflict
helped strengthen and preserve, not corrode, the enterprise.
My argument throughout the chapter is descriptive and analytic, not normative. I do not
address the questions of whether the political communities that operate on the international stage
are fair, who ought to participate in them, or what their governance projects ought to entail. My
only normative assumption is that it is desirable to have some such communities. A political community gives the participants opportunities to interact on particular governance issues, so it provides
the relational infrastructure for international law. In other words, having a political community
makes global governance, if not possible, at least more realizable than it otherwise would be.4
I. PLURALIST CONFLICT AS A DISINTEGRATIVE FORCE
A. The Skeptical Claim
Turkuler Isiksel crisply articulates the skeptical claim in her 2013 article, “Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm.”5 Isiksel recognizes that one virtue of legal pluralism is that it avoids the
hegemony of a unified order. But she contends that legal pluralism is also “vulnerable to concerns
about the centrifugal tendency of a ‘disorder of orders.’”6 Put differently, Isiksel doubts that we can
“transform pluralism into an ordering philosophy rather than a diagnosis of disorder.”7 The reason for
her skepticism is that she assumes that a pluralist structure is inherently or presumptively dissociative—that, because pluralist conflicts are not authoritatively resolved, they pull apart the members of
a given political community and must be countered by some unifying force in order to keep the
governance project alive. “After all,” she says, “the pressing task of social organization is not to amplify pluralism . . . but to find non-oppressive ways to channel and contain its centrifugal effects.”8
If we do not, Isiksel argues, we risk sliding into anarchy.9

3 E.g., Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, “International Law and the Rise of China,” Chicago Journal of International Law 7 (2006): 13. (“The most

effective and important institution today is the World Trade Organization . . . .”). Mark Wu, “Rethinking the Temporary Breach Puzzle: A Window
on the Future of International Trade Conflicts,” Yale Journal of International Law 40, no.1 (2015): 95–96. (“The World Trade Organization (WTO) is
often held to be an exemplar of a legitimate, effectively functioning institution of international law.”)
4 On the point that an international legal practice is inherently interactional, see Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in

International Law: An Interactional Account (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
5 Isiksel, “Global Legal Pluralism as Fact and Norm,” 182.
6 Ibid., 180 (quotes Neil Walker, “Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders,” International

Journal of Constitutional Law 6, no. 3–4 (July 2008): 376).
7 Ibid., 175.
8 Ibid., 185.
9 Ibid., 187–88.
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A similar assumption is implicit in much of the work on the pluralism in international law.
Scholars widely posit that global governance arrangements are constituted by the participants’ commonalities—shared interests, values, goals, or practices—and diminished by internal discord. Ineradicable conflicts that arise within a particular governance arrangement are treated as evidence that
the association and thus the arrangement itself is weak.
For example, according to the rational choice approach to international relations and international law, states and other global actors establish joint governance arrangements in order to realize their mutual objectives or solve their common problems.10 The shared agenda is what binds the
participants together. And while these actors might at times disagree about what they are doing
together or why, such conflicts are treated as obstacles to the enterprise that must be overcome.
Thus, most of the rational choice scholarship on international law focuses on how to buttress shared
norms—usually, norms that have been collectively prescribed in law—or how to deter or settle related
conflicts.11 Consider the usual, rational choice position on the WTO. It attributes the WTO’s success to the participants having been broadly committed to the same trade agenda and to curbing the
disputes that might otherwise have gotten in the way.12
The assumption that conflict is a disintegrative force also surfaces in constructivist theories
on so-called “communities of practice.” Emanuel Adler defined a community of practice as a group
of “people who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and
applying a common practice.”13 Adler acknowledges that the participants in a community occasionally disagree.14 But what defines and unites them as a community is their “like-mindedness” and
shared practice—common “routines, words, tools, ways of doing things, stories, symbols, and discourse.”15 A number of scholars have built on Adler’s work to define the communities that engage
with international law. Like Adler, these scholars define global governance communities by that

10 See e.g., Robert O. Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 334 (“Regimes are

developed in part because actors in world politics believe that with such arrangements they will be able to make mutually beneficial agreements that
would otherwise be difficult or impossible to attain.”).
11 E.g., Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13, 25, 29 (presenting

a theory of how international law fosters compliance with shared norms and thereby facilitates the attainment of mutual gains). Barbara Koremenos,
The Continent of International Law: Explaining Agreement Design (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 4–10 (arguing that different institutions
have unique design features to overcome specific obstacles to the shared agenda). Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, “The Empirical Turn in
International Legal Scholarship,” American Journal of International Law 106 (January 2012): 6 (“In the rational institutionalist paradigm, international
institutions facilitate state cooperation by reducing the transaction costs of negotiating international agreements with multiple parties, and by promoting compliance with them through monitoring and enforcement.”).
12 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, “International Law and the Limits of Macroeconomic Cooperation,” Southern California Law Review 86

(2013): 1033–3 (“The WTO dispute settlement system helps to orchestrate cooperation. . . . [It] has the capacity to resolve disputes over the meaning
of the rules, so that disagreements over ambiguous legal obligations do not degenerate into trade wars.”). See also Andrew Lang and Joanne Scott,
“The Hidden World of WTO Governance,” European Journal of International Law 20, no. 3 (August 2009): 604 (asserting that the WTO has helped
create “a relatively close-knit community of trade negotiators and governmental officials with a defined ‘ethos,’ a sense of common purpose, broadly
shared normative commitments, and common ways of defining and analyzing problems,” and suggesting that “this community is sustained [as] its
shared ideas are created and disseminated.”).
13 Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations (New York: Routledge, 2005), 15.
14 Ibid., 22 (“The joint enterprise of members of a community of practice does not necessarily mean a common goal or vision, although in most cases

it does.”).
15 Ibid., 15.
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which the participants share. More telling, they sometimes cite ineradicable divisions as evidence
either that the participants do not belong to the same community or that their community is thin.16
The skeptical claim is not limited to pluralist conflicts that arise within a single global governance arrangement. The claim is also made about conflicts that cut across multiple arrangements.17
As is well known, international law consists of a patchwork of separate and partially overlapping
arrangements. For example, the WTO is mostly independent of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Each has a distinct political community—the group of actors who engage with it—with its own
priorities, textual references, and institutions. Several studies have shown that, even when the same
actors participate simultaneously in multiple arrangements and support the policies of each in the
abstract, they routinely disagree about how to balance those policies in discrete settings. The resultant conflicts are pluralistic because they play out across different arrangements and cannot authoritatively be resolved by any one of them. The dominant view among international legal scholars is
that such conflicts damage both the specific arrangements at issue and the international legal system
itself. One commentator colorfully captured this view by contending that “[t]he absence of obvious
or agreed-upon mechanisms for resolving these disputes has threatened to tear international law
apart at the seams.”18
B. Responses to the Skeptical Claim
Although scholars widely assume that the skeptical claim is true—that pluralist conflicts are
inherently or presumptively dissociative for a group—they disagree about how serious of a problem
it is. The most common response to it is to argue that pluralist conflicts usually are, can be, or should
be curtailed.19 André Nollkaemper says that, given “the open and disputed nature” of a pluralist
legal structure, “the key role at the interface” between contending governance claims is a “willingness
to avoid conflict.”20 Paul Schiff Berman likewise argues that we should prioritize various processes

16 E.g., Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 80 (arguing that a “‘thin’ community of international legal practice” might

exist on the basis of “very limited shared understandings” but that “a deeper sense of community” develops as the participants “coalesce[] around the
emergence of common histories, values or norms.”). Ian Johnstone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organization (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2011), 44 (“If after extensive deliberation on an issue international legal opinion is sharply divided, then almost by definition
no interpretive ‘community’ exists, or perhaps there are multiple communities.”). Harlan Grant Cohen, “Finding International Law, Part II: Our
Fragmenting Legal Community,” New York University Journal of International Law & Politics 44 (2011), 1066–77, 1069 (asserting that a “legal community . . . is constituted by the members’ shared acceptance of certain ground rules and their shared expectations about good and bad argument,” so
while members might disagree on substance, their “disagreements over the legitimacy of particular sources may mean that international law is no
longer defined by a single legal community.”). See also Peter M. Haas, “Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution
Control,” International Organization 43, no. 3 (Summer 1989): 377, 380 (arguing that if an epistemic community “with a common perspective is able
to acquire and sustain control over a substantive policy domain,” it will “produce convergent state policies” and “the associated regime will become
stronger.”).
17 E.g., Ralf Michaels and Joost Pauwelyn, “Conflict of Norms or Conflict of Laws?: Different Techniques in the Fragmentation of Public International

Law,” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 22, no. 3 (2011), 350 (“There exists a widespread normative preference for coherence over
fragmentation. . . .”).
18 Cohen, “Finding International Law, Part II: Our Fragmenting Legal Community,” 1050.
19 See Nico Krisch, “Pluralism in International Law and Beyond,” in Fundamental Concepts for International Law: The Construction of a Discipline, ed.

Jean d’Aspremont and Sahib Singh (forthcoming 2018), 16, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613930 (reviewing literature and concluding that “many pluralist accounts reflect a particular normative mission, often focused on respect for diversity and . . . a minimization of jurisdictional conflicts.”).
20 “Inside or Out: Two Types of International Legal Pluralism,” in Normative Pluralism and International Law: Exploring Global Governance, ed. Jan

Klabbers and Touko Piiparinen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 94, 136.
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and mechanisms to “help mediate conflicts by . . . seeking ways of reconciling competing norms, and
by deferring to alternative approaches if possible.”21 Anne Peters presents constitutionalism as a
framework for doing just that—in her words, “for refining the techniques for the avoidance of conflict, and for designing clever mechanisms for resolving the unavoidable ones, in the absence of a
clear normative hierarchy.”22 These positions all concede the central premise of the skeptical claim;
they accept that the conflicts that result from legal pluralism are generally corrosive and should be
abated.
To be sure, a few scholars have challenged the claim head on. Yet even these scholars tend
to leave its central premise intact. For example, Daniel Halberstam contends that the U.S. and EU
legal orders are both pluralistic. His main point is that this structure is not inherently dissociative
for a political community—that it is “not a principle of disorder, but a principle of organization.”23
He explains that “[n]either the lack of settlement regarding the hierarchy of legal systems in Europe
nor the lack of settlement regarding the hierarchy of institutions in the United States leads to anarchy or chaos.”24 However, the reasons that Halberstam gives for this conclusion are that the key
players in each system habitually defer to and accommodate one another and ground their competing claims for authority in shared constitutional values. His argument thus focuses on how the participants find common ground and defuse their conflicts so as to keep their arrangement going. He
leaves open the possibility that, where those conditions do not hold, a pluralist structure is disintegrative.
II. PLURALIST CONFLICT AS AN INTEGRATIVE FORCE
My point of emphasis is that pluralist conflicts can themselves be a centripetal force that help
bind a political community and thus keep its arrangement going. I argue that a political community
is constituted and sustained by ongoing interactions about the governance project. These interactions can help construct the group, no matter whether they are harmonious or persistently conflictual. What matters is that the participants engage together on, invest in, and understand that they
are part of a common governance project. For associations that are, like many that operate on the
world stage, highly diverse or diffuse, conflictual interactions are likely to play an especially important integrative role. These groups are particularly reliant on conflict to bind themselves because
they otherwise have little in common or limited opportunities to interact.
A. Conflict’s Constitutive Role

21 Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law Beyond Borders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 10.
22 “Constitutional Fragments: On the Interaction of Constitutionalization and Fragmentation in International Law” (working paper, Centre for

Global Constitutionalism, University of St. Andrews, 2015): 41, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2591370.
23 Daniel Halberstam, “Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States,” in Ruling the World?

Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance, eds. Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Joel P. Trachtman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009),
326, 354.
24 Ibid., 336.
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The idea that conflict can be constructive for a governance association might seem counterintuitive but is not new.25 Bernard Yack attributes the idea to Aristotle himself. An Aristotelian
community is, according to Yack, comprised of “individuals who differ from each other in some
significant way.”26 Of course, that kind of diversity creates the grounds for conflict. People with real
differences invariably disagree about aspects of their social organization. But as Yack explains, Aristotle understood diversity as “a necessary element of community rather than the obstacle to social
harmony that community seeks to overcome.”27 People coalesce into a community not necessarily
by overcoming their differences but by engaging together in what Aristotle called a practice of justice—a practice of trying to establish and hold one another accountable to standards that are generalizable for the group.28
The practice of justice helps unify a community both by solidifying areas of agreement and
by structuring persistent conflict. First, community members who engage in the practice might eventually converge on common policies. If they do, the policies can be communal glue that binds them.29
Second, even when—as is more often the case—a practice of justice “structures nothing more than the
way we engage in conflict with each other, it still reinforces the sense that we participate with others in
a community.”30 It does so because the people who partake in the practice presuppose that they are
in a governance project together. They might disagree about which substantive standards are appropriate for the group, or about where governance authority for the group properly resides. But in
arguing about those issues, they take for granted that certain governance standards apply to the
group. They assume that it is a group.
The blend of commonality and conflict that binds a particular community depends on its
own makeup. Yet highly heterogeneous and loosely structured communities are especially dependent
on conflict to unify and sustain themselves. Members of these communities have little in common
or few opportunities or reasons to interact. For them, the most plausible alternative to coalescing
through conflict is not to coalesce through a drastic uptick in social unity. It is to have a less integrated community—one in which the members are less connected to the group or to its governance
project.

25 See e.g., Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), 137 (“[C]onflict, rather than being disruptive and

dissociating, may indeed be a means of balancing and hence maintaining a society as a going concern.”). Bernard Crick, In Defence of Politics (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962), 24 (“Diverse groups hold together because they practice politics—not because they agree about ‘fundamentals’. . . .”). Max Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), 23 (“[C]ustom unites where it divides.”). Don Herzog,
Household Politics: Conflict in Early Modern England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013), 128 (“Conflict, I’ll argue, isn’t the opposite of social
order. It’s what social order usually is.”). Albert O. Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society,” Political Theory 22, no. 2
(May 1994): 206 (reviewing literature on how “social conflict[] produce[s] . . . valuable ties that hold modern democratic societies together and provide
them with the strength and cohesion they need.”).
26 Bernard Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 29.
27 Ibid., 29–30. See also ibid., 15 (“Aristotle argues against Plato that the elimination of social heterogeneity threatens to eliminate political community

itself; community signifies for Aristotle a combination of sharing and differentiation rather than social unity.”).
28 Ibid., 40–42.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 43 (emphasis added).
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To illustrate, imagine that dozens of loners live on a deserted island. The islanders do not
have much in common or much reason to fight. They have almost nothing to do with one another.
We would hardly call their bunch a community. Now imagine that they get together once a week to
fight over island resources. At each meeting, they disagree—fiercely and intently—over the use and
distribution of the available resources. Depending on the week, some islanders get what they want,
while others bitterly lose out. Here, they at least have a recognizable governance association. Their
resource disputes help constitute, rather than diminish, their association because they congregate as
a group in order to have those disputes. Without the resources to fight over, they would not interact
or have a common enterprise.31
Note that a community that is constituted largely through conflict is not necessarily weaker
or more immature than one that displays high levels of social unity. Return to our hypothetical
island. Assume now that the islanders terminate their weekly meetings and anoint a king to make
all resource decisions on their behalf. The king acts arbitrarily, but the islanders follow his rule
because they see themselves as his subjects and would rather spend their time leading their loner
lives than arguing over resources. In this scenario, the islanders share a governance project and have
minimal levels of conflict. If their earlier conflicts were corrosive to or did not help constitute their
community, then anointing the king would have strengthened their community. But surely, the
group has become less cohesive and integrated. The islanders are completely checked out of their
governance project, no longer engaging together on it.
Some of the constructivist work on communities of practice gestures in a similar direction.
It highlights that international communities are constituted through social interaction.32 And it
acknowledges that the relevant interactions can be discordant.33 But because this work ultimately
defines a community by that which the members share—by their common practice—it misses, or at
least does not press, the key conceptual claim that I am advancing: a community is constituted not
just by commonality but also by disharmony and discord. In order to interact as a group, the islanders
needed a shared practice on when, where, and why they would meet. But that base of commonality
was insufficient to generate their interactions. They also needed conflict. Without the resource disputes, the islanders would not have created or used a shared practice—or, therefore, engaged together
on the governance project.
Readers might intuit that the community would be stronger still if its members interacted
regularly and had minimal conflict. However, that vision of a community is completely unrealizable,
and efforts to achieve it are often repressive.34 Even very homogenous and tightknit groups are replete with conflict. The commonalities that tie together the members of such groups and cause their

31 To be clear, my point is not that the islanders have nothing in common. My point is that their community is constituted both by their commonality—

here, their shared project to allocate resources—and by the associated conflicts. I expand on this point in the next few paragraphs.
32 Adler, Communitarian International Relations, 15, 23; Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 70, 72.
33 Adler, Communitarian International Relations, 21; Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 63.
34 Herzog, Household Politics: Conflict in Early Modern England, 146.
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lives to be so intertwined also give them many reasons and occasions to disagree.35 In other words,
conflict can bring people together, but coming together brings conflict.36 Conflict is a part of, not
inherently corrosive to, a social order.
Because conflict is inevitable in social life, creating space for it to occur routinely and in
relatively productive ways serves an important systemic function; it helps stabilize and fortify a community in the face of inevitable divisions. If nothing else, a conflict exposes individual priorities and
positions of relative strength or weakness within the group. When conflict is routinized, a community has ample opportunity to adjust its social structure so that internal strains do not become too
intense to withstand.37 To be clear, this “rebalancing” does not necessarily entail resolving or addressing the underlying dispute. The balance that is struck at any particular moment might be transitory or contentious. What strengthens the association is the social structure’s contestability. It reduces the risk that tensions will build, that antagonistic alliances will harden, and that conflicts will
express themselves in more virulent ways. Thus, even when a dispute does not lead to substantive
change or resolution, it might serve to clear the air and release pent up hostilities that would otherwise fester and become corrosive.38 The point is that conflict is not only inevitable in human groups;
it can also be productive for them.
It is not always. Some conflicts clearly diminish or threaten to tear apart a community. If the
weekly meetings on the island become too combative, attendance might drop. Some islanders might
prefer to do without the allocated resources than to engage with the group. Alternatively, a dissatisfied bunch might revolt and form a splinter group that competes with the original one for island
resources. In either event, the community could dissipate. As several theorists have explained, however, the best way to avoid such destructive conflicts—and to maintain the community as a going
concern—is not to try to ignore, suppress, or resolve intractable divisions. It is to enable community
members to have their disputes routinely and on terms that reinforce, rather than undercut, their
mutual association.39 The trick is to foster the “right” kinds of conflict.40

35 For evidence, see generally Max Gluckman’s anthropological work, Custom and Conflict in Africa.
36 See Herzog, Household Politics: Conflict in Early Modern England, 123–47.
37 Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 79, 151–52.
38 Chantal Mouffe, Agonistics: Thinking the World Politically (New York: Verso, 2013), 8 (“[When] passions cannot be given a democratic outlet . . . [t]he

ground is . . . [laid] for the multiplication of confrontations over non-negotiable moral values, with all the manifestations of violence that such confrontations entail.”). Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 40–41 (“Conflict serves as an outlet for the release of hostilities which, were no such outlet
provided, would sunder the relation between antagonists.”). Georg Simmel, Conflict: The Web of Group Affiliations (New York: The Free Press, 1955),
27 (“The sharpening of contrasts may be provoked directly for the sake of its own diminution . . . in the expectation that the antagonism, once it
reaches a certain limit, will end because of exhaustion or the realization of its futility.”).
39 E.g., Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 137. Crick, In Defence of Politics, 24. Gluckman, Custom and Conflict in Africa. Herzog, Household Politics:

Conflict in Early Modern England, 128. Hirschman, “Social Conflicts as Pillars of Democratic Market Society,” 206.
40 Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (New York: Routledge, 2005), 20 (explaining that adversaries “must see themselves as belonging to the same

political association . . . [and] sharing a common symbolic space,” even as they continue to disagree.). Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, 157
(“Conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure in which there is no or insufficient toleration and institutionalization of conflict.”). Cf. Paul
Schiff Berman, “Global Legal Pluralism,” Southern California Law Review 80 (2007): 1164, 1166 (arguing that mechanisms that “deliberately seek to
create or preserve spaces for conflict among multiple, overlapping legal systems” “can potentially help to channel (or even tame) normative conflict”
(emphasis omitted).).
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B. The Unifying Effects of Legal Conflict
A pluralist legal structure might do just that. In a pluralist structure, contests about the exercise of governance authority look a lot like the Aristotelian practice of justice. Adversaries advance
competing claims on the law, but they assume that, whatever the law is, it applies to the relevant
group.41 This is true, no matter whether the conflict is internal to a single arrangement or cuts across
multiple arrangements. In either event, the conflict is about how or by whom authority is exercised
for a particular community. Even as the conflict pits individual members against each another, it
reinforces that the community is a community.
The idea that legal conflict can help constitute a political community has been developed in
U.S. constitutional theory. To be clear, the idea here is that conflict itself does this work; a conflict
need not be resolved and might best be left unresolved to nurture a community. For example, Robert
Post and Reva Siegel argue that, on some issues in U.S. constitutional law, “authoritative settlement
is neither possible nor desirable.”42 Their example is the right to an abortion. Because Americans
disagree about this right, it has been pliable and contentious for decades. Post and Siegel contend
that, “[s]o long as groups continue to argue about the meaning of our common Constitution, so
long do they remain committed to a common constitutional enterprise.”43 By this account, the Constitution is “a discursive medium through which individuals and groups engage in disputes about
ideal forms of collective life.”44 Such disputes can “strengthen social cohesion and constitutional
legitimacy in a normatively heterogeneous nation like our own” because the Constitution is a key
referent that defines Americans as a community.45 An intense and protracted constitutional conflict
can bring Americans together to fight about their joint enterprise.
Further, several scholars have underscored that, in the face of deep normative divisions, such
engagement with the enterprise is best sustained by keeping the law pliable.46 The Constitution’s
contestability allows people with competing perspectives to continue tapping into and arguing
through it—using constitutional law to advance their competing priorities, as they partake together

41 See Karl N. Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence (Norman: University of Oklahoma

Press, 1941), 277 (explaining that, in law, “claims get made and urged in terms of the Order” and “tend powerfully to be set up as serving the welfare
of the relevant Entirety.”). Yack, The Problems of a Political Animal, 57 (“In political communities the standards that define this sense of mutual obligation are expressed in laws, that is, in public rules open to discussion and revision.”).
42 Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, “Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 42 (2007):

378.
43 Ibid., 427.
44 Reva B. Siegel, “Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150

(2001): 326.
45 Post and Siegel, “Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash,” 405. See also Frank Michelman, “Law’s Republic,” The Yale Law Journal

97, no. 8 (1988): 1513 (noting the “conscious reference by those involved to their mutual and reciprocal awareness of being co-participants not just in
this one debate, but in a more encompassing common life”).
46 E.g., Reva B. Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the de facto ERA,” California

Law Review 94 (2006): 1328, 1418–19. Christopher L. Kutz, “Just Disagreement: Indeterminacy and Rationality in the Rule of Law,” The Yale Law
Journal 103 (1993): 1004 (“[A] legal system is healthiest when there is conflict and dissent among its claims, because even irresolvable conflict is a sign
of energy and attention.”). Michelman, “Law’s Republic,” 1529 (“Legal indeterminacy in that sense is the precondition of the dialogic, critical-transformative dimension of our legal practice.”).
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in this governance project. By contrast, high levels of legal settlement risk estranging dissatisfied
groups from the law.47 That risk might be especially pronounced in international law. Americans
who are boxed out of constitutional law have other opportunities to participate in communal life,
but such opportunities are more attenuated at the global level.
III. PLURALIST CONFLICTS AT THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
I use the WTO as my case study, because compared to many other global governance associations, the one at the WTO has been especially strong and well-integrated. The WTO “club” or
“insider network” has consisted of actors who regularly interact on the trade project—national trade
officials, international civil servants, academics, and private sector attorneys and consultants. 48
WTO adjudicators have historically also been key players in this community. Other actors have participated more indirectly, episodically, or on the margins.
As discussed, the WTO’s success has often been attributed to the members’ shared precepts—
their common objectives, rules, and practices—and to the mechanisms for curbing their disputes. I
aim to show that that picture is deeply incomplete. Although the participants in the WTO have had
plenty in common, they have also had profound, at times intractable governance disputes. In the
face of these internal divisions, WTO law has helped constitute and strengthen the group partly
through a pluralist structure. It has left unanswered and allowed the participants to keep fighting
over key questions on trade governance.
A. Agenda Conflicts
Since the WTO was established in 1994, its participants have consistently grappled with the
questions of when and how the WTO mandate on trade liberalization bends to accommodate other
regulatory policies that individual states might want to pursue.49 These questions lie at the heart of
trade governance. They are simultaneously about the content of trade policy and about the extent
to which governance authority resides in the hands of individual states. Disputes about them have
been a persistent and largely intractable feature of the WTO.50
In WTO law, the question presented is usually whether a national restriction on trade falls
within one of the recognized “public interest” exceptions to liberalization.51 A series of decisions

47 Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change,” 1328.
48 E.g., Robert Howse, “From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime,” American Journal of International

Law 96, no. 1 (January 2002): 98. Richard B. Stewart and Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, “The World Trade Organization: Multiple Dimensions of
Global Administrative Law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 9 (2011): 560.
49 Andrew Lang, World Trade Law after Neoliberalism: Reimagining the Global Economic Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 57–58; Howse,

“From Politics to Technocracy—and Back Again,” 95.
50 For an excellent overview of this contest within the WTO, see Robert Howse, “The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global Governance

by Judiciary,” European Journal of International Law 27, no. 1(February 2016): 9.
51 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,

1867 U.N.T.S. 187. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
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predating the WTO interpreted those exceptions narrowly, prioritizing liberalization over states’ autonomy to pursue other regulatory goals, like protecting human health or the environment.52 As
discontent with that approach grew, the WTO Appellate Body shifted gears. It started affording
states more discretion to restrict trade for other interests.53 Yet the Appellate Body has not in any
meaningful sense established concrete rules of decision on the public interest exceptions or settled
the lines of authority. Its test for assessing measures that are justified in the public interest has been
opaque, shifty, and fact-specific.54 What the Appellate Body has done is move toward a more pluralist structure. It has created space for states to use WTO law to keep fighting about the proper balance
between the WTO policy on liberalization and their own idiosyncratic regulatory goals. This balance
is unstable and consistently at issue in WTO legal disputes.
The 2014 decision in EC-Seal Products is illustrative.55 Canada and Norway contested a European Union regulation that prohibited the importation and sale of products containing seal, with
exceptions for seals hunted by indigenous communities or for marine management. The case was
widely understood to be about more than the particular regulation at issue; it was about the extent
to which the WTO community would permit states to restrict trade in deference to their own national policies.56 The Appellate Body decided that trade restrictions for animal welfare can fall within
one of the public interest exceptions to liberalization but that the particular regulation at issue was,
in one respect, non-compliant.57 Trade scholars have criticized the decision for its muddy reasoning,
departures from precedent, and failure to guide states on the larger contest that the case presented—

52 E.g., Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS21/R (September 3, 1991), GATT BISD (39th Supp.), at 155 (1991)

(environment). Report of the Panel, United States—Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R (June 16, 1994) (same). Report of the Panel, Thailand—
Restrictions on Importation of and International Taxes on Cigarettes, ¶ 24, DS10/R (November 7, 1990), GATT BISD (37th Supp.), at 200 (1990) (health).
53 See Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia,

WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted November 21, 2001). Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp
Products, ¶ 121, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted November 6, 1998). Diane A. Desierto, “Public Policy in International Investment and Trade
Law: Community Expectations and Functional Decision-Making,” Florida Journal of International Law 26 (2014): 70–71 (“Despite some well-known
victories . . . full acceptance of States’ regulatory freedom to enact policies that vindicate public interest or human rights concerns remains very much
a work-in-progress throughout the WTO system” (footnotes omitted).).
54 See, e.g., Lorand Bartels, “The Chapeau of the General Exceptions in the WTO GATT and GATS Agreements: A Reconstruction,” American

Journal of International Law 109, no. 1 (January 2015): 96 (explaining that trade measures have repeatedly been deemed noncompliant for failing to
satisfy the chapeau of the provision with the public interest exceptions but that “it is still not clear what [the chapeau] requires.”). Andrew D. Mitchell
and Caroline Henckels, “Variations on a Theme: Comparing the Concept of ‘Necessity’ in International Investment Law and WTO Law,” Chicago
Journal of International Law 14, no. 1 (2013): 155 (reviewing cases and concluding that “[t]he test has been expressed in a number of different ways and
indeed seems to change each time it is articulated.”).
55 Appellate Body Reports, European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, WTO Docs. WT/DS400/AB/R,

WT/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Seal Products].
56 See, e.g., Robert Howse and Joanna Langille, “Permitting Pluralism: The Seal Products Dispute and Why the WTO Should Accept Trade Re-

strictions Justified by Noninstrumental Moral Values,” Yale Journal of International Law 37, no. 2 (2012): 430 (suggesting that the case is about whether,
“by permitting pluralism, the WTO fulfills its own institutional mandate more effectively and does not unnecessarily encroach on the regulatory
autonomy of member states”). Julia Y. Qin, “Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives Under WTO Law: Reflections on EC—Seal Products,” AJIL
Unbound (June 25, 2015, 11:42 AM), www.asil.org/blogs/accommodating-divergent-policy-objectives-under-wto-law-reflections-ec%E2%80%94sealproducts (claiming that the case is about how WTO law would “accommodate divergent legitimate purposes of domestic regulation”).
57 Seal Products, ¶¶ 5.194–5.201, 5.338–5.339.
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that is, for preserving a pluralist structure, rather than defining more concretely the lines of authority
in WTO law.58
But leaving that structure in place allowed states to continue arguing through WTO law.
Here, WTO law brought states together to fight about their trade agenda on terms that reinforce
that this is part of where trade governance happens. The alternative to having these conflicts in WTO
law is not more unity on trade policy or more integration of the political community at the WTO.
WTO members invariably disagree on precisely when and how the policy on liberalization intersects
with other interests. The most plausible alternative is for the Appellate Body to try to settle the
balance once and for all, and for dissatisfied states to dissociate, in one way or another, from the
enterprise. After all, if the law were settled, states would have less reason to expend the energy to
crystalize and fight for their positions—or, therefore, to engage with the WTO in this way. They
might try to undercut WTO by shifting decision-making to arenas that they find more favorable.
They might just disregard the WTO rules with which they disagree or refuse to participate in WTO
processes when they are unlikely to prevail. By contrast, playing out their conflicts through WTO
law at least kept them invested in the enterprise. It had the effect of sustaining, not dissolving, the
association.
B. Constitutive Conflicts
The WTO community has also been beset by conflicts about its constitutive structure—about
who may participate in governance decisions at the WTO and on what terms.59 For example, the
participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) received considerable attention in the
1990s and early 2000s.60 NGOs were becoming more aware of the WTO and interested in shaping
trade policy. The initial response from within the WTO was meager. The General Council, which
consists of all WTO member states, decided to give NGOs new opportunities to interact with and

58 E.g., Gregory C. Shaffer and David Pabian, “European Communities—Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products,”

American Journal of International Law 109 (2015): 158–59. Donald H. Regan, “Measures with Multiple Purposes: Puzzles from EC–Seal Products,” AJIL
Unbound (June 25, 2015, 11:41 AM), www.asil.org/blogs/measures-multiple-purposes-puzzles-ec%E2%80%94seal-products. Joel Trachtman, “The
WTO Seal Products Case: Doctrinal and Normative Confusion,” AJIL Unbound (June 25, 2015, 11:38 AM), www.asil.org/blogs/wto-seal-products-casedoctrinal-and-normative-confusion. Qin, “Accommodating Divergent Policy Objectives Under WTO Law.” But cf. Robert Howse, Joanna Langille,
and Katie Sykes, “Pluralism in Practice: Moral Legislation and the Law of the WTO After Seal Products,” The George Washington International Law Review
48 (2015): 149 (arguing that, though the Appellate Body ideally would not have “sacrifice[d] clarity,” its decision “was ultimately not as problematic”
as others say because it “was generally rooted in an appropriate and subtle understanding of the WTO’s institutional role”).
59 I focus in the main text on the participation of nongovernmental organizations. Similar conflicts in the WTO have concerned: (1) the participation

of particular states, (2) the dominance of an insider group in decision-making, (3) the limited opportunities for direct stakeholder involvement, (4)
the apparent disenfranchisement of developing countries, and (5) the role or influence of other intergovernmental bodies. For tastes of these other
conflicts, see Yves Bonzon, Public Participation and Legitimacy in the WTO (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Sarah Joseph, Blame It on
the WTO?: A Human Rights Critique (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 56–90; Raj Bhala, “Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s WTO
Accession Saga,” American University International Law Review 15, no. 6 (2000): 1469–1538; Gregory C. Shaffer and Joel Trachtman, “Interpretation
and Institutional Choice at the WTO,” Virginia Journal of International Law 52, no. 1 (2011): 127–35; Stewart and Badin, “The World Trade Organization: Multiple Dimensions of Global Administrative Law.”
60 See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, “Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests,” Fordham International Law Journal 24, no. 1 (2000): 173. Philip M.

Nichols, “Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade Organization,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 17 (1996):
851. Gregory C. Shaffer, “The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO’s Treatment of Trade
and Environment Matters,” Harvard Environmental Law Review 25 (2001): 61–68.
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learn about the WTO, while keeping them at the periphery of WTO decision-making.61 The Council
proclaimed that “there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be
directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings.”62 Shortly thereafter, the WTO Appellate
Body decided, with highly legalistic interpretations of the relevant treaty, that WTO adjudicative
bodies may consider amicus curiae briefs that NGOs submit.63
The Appellate Body’s legal decisions on amicus briefs provoked an intense contest.64 The
dispute came to a head in November 2000, when the Appellate Body took the initiative to establish
“working procedures” for the submission of amicus briefs in a case that was then before it.65 States
responded loudly and negatively. They convened a special General Council meeting on the issue,
and almost every state that spoke criticized the Appellate Body’s approach.66 Developing countries
were especially vocal; their principal complaints went directly to the lines of authority within the
WTO.
Uruguay’s comments are representative. It claimed that the Appellate Body’s working procedures improperly “affected the rights and obligations of WTO Members and altered the relationship
between the bodies within the system.”67 Uruguay’s worries were twofold. First, the Appellate Body
arrogated for itself “decisions on relations with NGOs while such decisions statutorily belonged to
the General Council.”68 Second, the Appellate Body effectively “grant[ed] individuals and institutions outside of the WTO a right that Members themselves did not possess.”69 Egypt, speaking on
behalf of the Informal Group of Developing Countries, echoed those concerns, underscoring that
“[t]he WTO was a Member-driven organization and this basic fundamental nature of the organization had to, and would, remain as such.”70 India proclaimed that “the effect of the Appellate Body’s

61 See WTO General Council, Guidelines for Arrangements on Relations with Non-Governmental Organizations, WTO Doc. WT/L/162 (July 23,

1996) [hereinafter NGO Guidelines]. Robert Howse, “Membership and Its Privileges: The WTO, Civil Society, and the Amicus Brief Controversy,”
European Law Journal 9 (August 2003): 497 (explaining that these opportunities were marginal and intentionally disconnected from the hub of WTO
decision-making).
62 NGO Guidelines, ¶ VI.
63 See Appellate Body Report, United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp & Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 106–10, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted

November 6, 1998) (deciding that WTO panels may consider unsolicited NGO amicus briefs). Appellate Body Report, United States–Imposition of
Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom, ¶¶ 39–42, WTO Doc.
WT/DS138/AB/R (adopted June 7, 2000) (deciding that the Appellate Body has this authority).
64 A similar conflict about amicus briefs has recently been playing out in international investment law. For an overview, see Katia Fach Gómez,

“Rethinking the Role of Amicus Curiae in International Investment Arbitration: How to Draw the Line Favorably for the Public Interest,” Fordham
International Law Journal 35, no. 2 (2012): 510.
65 Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 50–52, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R

(adopted April 5, 2001).
66
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68 Ibid., ¶ 6.
69 Ibid., ¶ 7.
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approach to amicus curiae briefs was to strike at the intergovernmental nature of the WTO.”71 As
these comments reveal, the dispute was as contentious as it was not because amicus briefs are so
important but because it went to the core of the WTO’s governance structure: would this community
remain insular and controlled mostly by states, or would it integrate other actors and allocate more
authority to its adjudicative bodies?
In the end, the contest over amicus briefs fizzled, without authoritative resolution. The Appellate Body decided that none of the non-party briefs in the case before it satisfied its working
procedures.72 Since then, WTO adjudicative bodies have accepted amicus briefs on a case-by-case
basis, without establishing concrete rules on when such briefs are relevant.73 Meanwhile, NGOs have
identified other ways to engage with the WTO,74 but their terms of participation remain fluid and
contestable.75 Perhaps for these reasons, commentators have said that the amicus dispute “produced
little more than frustration”76 or was “much ado about nothing.”77
Those statements again overlook how pluralist conflicts can construct a community. The
amicus dispute not only presupposed that a political community at the WTO existed but also treated
this community as worth fighting for—as if belonging and exercising authority in it mattered. The
dispute was particularly significant because it gave developing countries, which historically have been
marginalized at the WTO,78 an opportunity to reaffirm their stake in it and claim it as their own.
Again, the alternative was not more unity or consensus. It was for one WTO organ to try to settle
the issue, with the effect of further alienating an important constituency—either developing countries
or the group of NGOs and their supporters. The Appellate Body’s legal decisions on amicus briefs
incited a conflict that, though never really resolved, reinforced the community’s standing as an important locus of trade governance.
C. External Conflicts

71 Ibid., ¶ 38.
72 See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶¶ 55–56, WTO Doc.

WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted April 5, 2001).
73 See Eric De Brabandere, “NGOs and the ‘Public Interest’: The Legality and Rationale of Amicus Curiae Interventions in International Economic

and Investment Disputes,” Chicago Journal of International Law 12 (2011): 87, 110.
74 See Seema Sapra, “The WTO System of Trade Governance: The Stale NGO Debate and the Appropriate Role for Non-state Actors,” Oregon Review

of International Law 11 (2009): 90–94. But cf. Peter Van den Bossche, “NGO Involvement in the WTO: A Comparative Perspective,” Journal of
International Economic Law 11 (2008): 747 (arguing that NGO participation is still low).
75 See Bonzon, Public Participation and Legitimacy in the WTO, 1–7.
76 Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Public Participation in the Trade Regime: Of Litigation, Frustration, Agitation, and Legitimation,” Rutgers Law Review 56, no.

4 (2004): 965.
77 Petros C. Mavroidis, “Amicus Curiae Briefs Before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing,” in European Integration and International Co-ordination, ed.

Armin von Bogdandy and Yves Meny (2002), 317.
78 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶ 3, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) (pledg-

ing to “address[] the marginalization of least-developed countries in international trade and to improv[e] their effective participation in the multilateral
trading system”).
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Finally, states sometimes instigate conflicts between the WTO and other international legal
arrangements. A well-known example is the extended conflict over the regulation of foods containing
genetically modified organisms (“GMOs”). WTO law requires national restrictions on food imports
that exceed international standards to be based on scientific risk assessments and “not maintained
without sufficient scientific evidence.”79 In the 1990s, some states began resisting that standard, in
favor of a more precautionary approach. These states failed to change the law within the WTO, so
they looked elsewhere—to a legal arrangement that was more amenable to their preferences. They
used the Convention on Biological Diversity to establish the Cartagena Protocol, which implicitly
undercuts the WTO standard by endorsing the precautionary principle and openly preserving some
state discretion in this area.80 Here, a group of dissatisfied states exploited international law’s pluralist structure to create a normative conflict between the WTO and the regime on biological diversity.
The conflict over the proper scope of a state’s regulatory discretion on GMOs has never really
been resolved. A WTO adjudicative panel had the opportunity to define the WTO standard, in light
of the Cartagena Protocol, in European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products. The panel chose instead to decide the case on narrow grounds, without resolving
the broader legal question.81 Thus, although that particular GMO dispute has dissipated, an authoritative settlement on the law has not been reached. Either side could easily reignite the legal conflict
simply by reasserting its position in a new context.
Because many of the same states participate both in the WTO and in the Convention on
Biological Diversity, the GMO dispute was simultaneously internal to the trade community and
between it and the biodiversity one. There is little evidence that this dispute damaged the WTO. It
might instead have helped to strengthen the WTO. If nothing else, it revealed the fortitude of the
opposition to the WTO standard and provided opportunities for organic, even transitory adjustments. The dispute was also a way for dissatisfied states to continue engaging with and pressing for
their vision of the WTO. The principal backers of the Cartagena Protocol worked through the Convention on Biological Diversity not because they had given up on the WTO or sought to shift the
overall locus of trade governance but because they were invested in the WTO and wanted it to reflect
their preferences. They provoked a normative conflict as a way of participating in the trade project.
IV. CONCLUSION
The skeptical claim on legal pluralism assumes that pluralist conflicts are inherently or presumptively destructive to global governance associations. The assumption is wrong. Although such
conflicts might in some circumstances be a centrifugal force that tears apart a community and corrodes its governance project, they can also—and probably more often—have the opposite effect. As

79 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures art. 2.2, April 15, 1994; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World

Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493; see also ibid., art. 5.1 (requiring risk assessment).
80 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity arts. 1, 2.4, 10–11, January 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208.
81 See Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, paras. 7.75, 7.92–7.95, 8.3–8.10, WTO

Docs. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS 292/2, WT/DS 293/R (adopted September 29, 2006). Mark A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation
Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 187–97, 222.
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the case study on the WTO suggests, these conflicts can be a centripetal force that helps keep the
community going and allows its project to prosper. Scholars who advance the skeptical claim thus
need to move beyond their sweeping platitudes and begin to examine pluralist conflicts that arise in
discrete settings. They need to show that, in particular situations, such conflicts do more harm than
good.
The argument is not just of theoretical interest; it has important practical implications. If we
assume that political communities are constituted only by commonality and necessarily corroded by
intractable divisions, the prescriptive message is clear: to the extent that we want to support a particular global governance arrangement, we ought to use international law to solidify as much consensus
about it as possible and insist on curbing or deterring related disputes. But if conflict is itself constructive for the community, those moves will sometimes be wrongheaded and even counterproductive. The best way to strengthen a governance arrangement might be not to try to abate or manage
pluralist conflicts but to allow such conflicts to thrive.
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